

## LATE AND UNRELIABLE TCR PLANNING

### Consequences

- Wastage of capacity
- Higher and uncompetitive costs of rail (born by RUs and customers)
- Unreliable rail services for customers (cancellations, re-routings, later delivery)

### Solution

#### To have early and stable TCR planning, there should be:

- The introduction of motivating financial incentives for IMs (via compensation schemes to RUs)
- A target set of “minimisation of TCR impact on customers”
- Enforcement of harmonisation of IMs’ planning milestones
- Enforcement of multi-annual and stable IM budgets

## INCOMPATIBLE PATCHWORK OF NATIONAL MARKETS AND POLICIES

### Consequences

- Only modest harmonisation achieved despite continuous efforts by the sector and through law (missing enforcement of already binding EU law)
- Higher prices for customers due to higher bureaucracy to operate in more networks (more staff and IT needed to comply with national rules)

### Solution

#### To facilitate all traffic at the same level, there should be:

- The creation of sector-independent governance supervision to **enforce sector-defined** rules/norms within limited timeframes (harmonised processes and common IT standards) and applicable cross-border

### Abbreviations

TCR - temporary capacity restrictions (due to works and possessions); RU – Railway Undertaking; IM – Infrastructure Manager

## MISSING EUROPEAN NETWORK VIEW AND COORDINATION

### Consequences

- Capacity and investments losses due to missing national and cross-border coordination
- National processes and borders still affect the quality of international timetables (longer travel times, inadequate connections, higher production costs and thus prices)
- Inability to deliver goods and transport passengers due to uncoordinated TCRs creating bottlenecks and blocking re-routings → shift to road (sometimes permanent)
- Unreliability of international trains (delays, cancellations that spill over from one network to other)
- Current harmonisation completely dependent of sector consensus

### Solution

#### There should be:

- Obligations on IMs to work as single European Network (in a holistic origin-destination view)
- Conditional EU funding based on works coordination and traffic impact consultation
- The creation of sector-independent governance supervision in case IMs and RUs disagree on alignment, which is applicable cross-border

## MISSING INTEGRATION (COLLABORATION) WITH RAIL CONNECTED FACILITIES

### Consequences

- Terminals, ports, sidings, platforms and other facilities are not aligned with rail capacity planning/allocation
- Waste of capacity, lost investments, extra workload/costs to align and re-plan born by RUs and or customers

### Solution

#### There should be:

- Obligations on IMs and Service Facilities owners to work as a single European Network (in holistic origin-destination view), and to align planning and allocation processes
- Obligations on the sector to digitalise the aligned processes

## RIGIDITY AND INSTABILITY OF ANNUAL TIMETABLES

### Consequences

- Missing good capacity availability at short notice, to get quality now, RU must order 8-15 months ahead → lorries can go any time
- As consequence: freight RUs order ahead even without knowing the details:
  - High track reservation fees will not solve it, risk of no capacity is too high – no capacity – no contract
  - Extra workload for IMs/RUs in replanning

### Solution

#### There should be:

- The possibility for IMs to set aside capacity from the Annual Timetable for times when the business demand is clearly specified
- Obligations on IMs to decide on the amount and quality of this capacity in dialogue with RUs
- Capacity defined in non-rigid ways (no departure minutes, but slots/time) to allow flexibility and optimisation of the annual timetable

## RISK OF RIGID AND NON-COMPETITIVE SUPPLY-SYSTEM

### Consequences

- Freight market is dynamic, rigid structures fixed by IMs 2-3 years in advance will not reflect changing world and demands → road even more flexible than today
- Low flexibility caused by pre-planned and fixed paths → customers must adjust to railways, not other way around. → road in higher advantage
- Timetables unilaterally decided by IMs, despite RU's deeper understanding of customer needs

### Solution

#### There should be a system which is driven by the market, and thus:

- Obliges IMs to base long-term planning on dialogue with RUs and their customers
- Obliges IMs to work as a single European Network (in holistic origin-destination view)
- Tasks IMs to actively replan and incorporate market changes in a moving horizon (i.e. specific timings guaranteed few months before departure)

## MISSING MULTIANNUAL CAPACITY COMMITMENTS

### Consequences

Risk of not having (good or any) capacity to run the traffic in the near future / next period is born by RUs, who cannot influence it. IMs have no real incentive to manage the risk. This means:

- Higher prices to end-customers (margin for extra costs for unexpected IM-driven re-routings) or financial loss from originally profitable contracts
- Low reliability of railways compared to road, where goods can always be delivered

### Solution

#### There should be IM-RU capacity contracts beyond artificial annual timetable periods. The contracts should be:

- From origin to destination (cross-border) and available irrespective of whether the RU/forwarder has national license
- Concludable on short notice (not overly bureaucratic)
- Consistent with the duration of RU-end-customer contracts
- Including compensation mechanism if not respected

## OUTDATED AND SUBOPTIMAL CAPACITY DISTRIBUTION

### Consequences

- Less trains running, due to lower (motivation for) optimisation
- TCR impact on traffic is not considered in IMs' planning

### Solution

#### There should be an allocation rules scheme that:

- Incentivises optimisation of all involved (including alternatives) rather than creating one winner
- Is based on socio-economic criteria and considers international and national needs
- Is applied only if RUs-IMs do not find common solution
- Values strongly the impact on passengers/cargo in TCR planning

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