CAPACITY MATTERS

SOLUTIONS FOR KNOWN RAIL CAPACITY ISSUES

FORUM TRAIN EUROPE

LATE AND UNRELIABLE TCR PLANNING

Consequences

- Wastage of capacity
- Late ticket sales compared to air and road and still changes after tickets are sold
- Higher costs (compensations to passengers, rail replacement service) Suffering passenger satisfaction (timetable changes, delays, cancellations)

Solution

To have early and stable TCR planning, there should be:

- Motivating financial incentives for IMs (compensation schemes to RUs)
- A target set of “minimisation of TCR impact on passengers”
- Enforcement of harmonisation of IMs´ planning milestones
- Enforcement of multi-annual and stable IM budgets

INCOMPATIBLE PATCHWORK OF NATIONAL MARKETS AND POLICIES

Consequences

- Only modest harmonisation achieved despite continuous efforts by the sector and through law (missing enforcement of already binding EU law)
- Higher prices for customers due to higher bureaucracy to operate in more networks (more staff and IT needed to comply with national rules)
- Less choice for international passengers

Solution

To facilitate all traffic at the same level, there should be:

- The creation sector-independent governance supervision to **enforce** sector-defined rules/norms within limited timeframes (harmonised processes and common IT standards) and applicable cross-border

MISSING EUROPEAN NETWORK VIEW AND COORDINATION

Consequences

- Capacity and investments losses due to missing national and cross-border coordination
- National processes and borders still affect the quality of international timetables (longer travel times, inadequate connections, higher production costs and thus prices)
- Inability to deliver goods and transport passengers due to uncoordinated TCRs creating bottlenecks and blocking re-routings → shift to road (sometimes permanent)
- Unreliability of international trains (delays, cancelations that spill over from one network to other)
- Current harmonisation completely dependent of sector consensus

Solution

There should be:

- Obligations on IMs to work as single European Network (in holistic origin-destination view)
- Conditional EU funding based on works coordination and traffic impact consultation
- The creation of sector-independent governance supervision in case IMs and RUs disagree on alignment, and applicable cross-border

MISSING INTEGRATION (COLLABORATION) WITH RAIL CONNECTED FACILITIES

Consequences

- Terminals, ports, sidings, platforms and other facilities are not aligned with rail capacity planning/allocation
- Waste of capacity, lost investments, extra workload/costs to align and re-plan born by RUs and or customers

Solution

There should be:

- Obligations on IMs and Service Facilities owners to work as single European Network (in holistic origin-destination view), and to align planning and allocation processes
- Obligations on the sector to digitalise the aligned processes

Abbreviations

TCR - temporary capacity restrictions (due to works and possessions); RU – Railway Undertaking; IM – Infrastructure Manager

To make it happen

GREEN DEAL





For further details, see FTE - ALLRAIL - ERFA aligned positions on www.forumtraineurope.eu/services/ttr/fte-positions-on-ttr

CAPACITY MATTERS

SOLUTIONS FOR KNOWN RAIL CAPACITY ISSUES

FTE FORUM TRAIN EUROPE

RIGIDITY AND INSTABILITY OF ANNUAL TIMETABLES

Consequences

Many annual requests (without defined details) are still coordinated with stable requests →

- Compromise with paths that are later cancelled → suboptimal timetables
- More workload for all RUs and IMs

Solution

If the law allows IMs to reserve capacity from the Annual Timetable for short-term requests, then there should be:

- Obligations on IMs to decide on the amount and quality of this capacity in dialogue with RUs
- Capacity defined in non-rigid ways (not fixed to departure minutes, but slots/time) to ensure flexibility for all trains
- Capacity available also for passenger trains

RISK OF RIGID AND NON-COMPETATIVE SUPPLY-SYSTEM

Consequences

- Rigid structures fixed by IMs 2-3 years in advance do not reflect changing demand, forcing passengers to accept the IM-determined timetables or not use trains, instead of running trains based on passenger-demand → road/air in advantage and more flexible
- Timetables unilaterally decided by IMs, despite RU's deeper understanding of customer needs and the production →1 wrong IM planned path → risk of all service unprofitable

Solution

There should be a system which is driven by the market, and thus:

- Obliges IMs to base long-term planning on dialogue with RUs and their customers (to support traffic increases)
- Obliges IMs to work as single European Network (in holistic origin-destination view)
- Tasks IMs to not apply rigid/outdated plans, but to actively and flexibly incorporate market changes in moving horizon until guaranteed timetables allow ticket sales minimum 6 months before departure

MISSING MULTIANNUAL CAPACITY COMMITMENTS

Consequences

Risk of not having (good or any) capacity to run the traffic in the near future / next period is born by RUs, who cannot influence it. IMs have no real incentive to manage the risk. This means :

- That unexpected IM-initiated re-routings/cancellation due to TCRs lead to either higher prices for PSO authorities OR RU financial loss from originally profitable model
- Low incentives for investments: why new rolling stock when it may happen that it cannot be used? Why introduce new connection, when after one year there might be no capacity to continue?

Solution

There should be available (universally throughout Europe) IM-RU capacity contracts beyond artificial annual timetable periods. The contracts should be:

- From origin to destination (cross-border)
- Concludable on short notice (not overly bureaucratic)
- For periods as long as the duration of PSO contracts and at least up to several years for open access → to ensure investment stability, business-customer predictability, and lower risk for bidders in PSO tenders (thus lower price)
- Including compensation mechanism if not respected

OUTDATED AND SUBOPTIMAL CAPACITY DISTRIBUTION

Consequences

- less trains running, due to lower (motivation for) optimisation
- TCR impact on traffic is not considered in IMs´ planning

Solution

There should be an allocation rules scheme that:

- Incentivises optimisation of all involved (including alternatives) rather than creating one winner
- Is based on socio-economic criteria and considers international and national needs
- Is applied only if RUs-IMs do not find common solution
- Values strongly impact on the passengers/cargo in TCR planning

Abbreviations

TCR - temporary capacity restrictions (due to works and possessions); RU – Railway Undertaking; IM – Infrastructure Manager, PSO – Public Service Obligation

To make it happen

GREEN DEAL

30 by 2030

Double by 2030 Triple by 2050 High Speed

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